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Abstract 
 
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the policy-controlled 
interest rates (Repo and Treasury bill rates) and the bank interest rates (interbank, deposit and 
lending rates) in Rwanda with the view to empirically examine the size and speed of the interest 
rate pass-through in the long run and short run and determine whether the pass-through process is 
symmetric or asymmetric. The empirical results of the paper indicate that the lending rates are 
cointegrated with none of the selected policy rates; hence the interest rate pass-through has been 
estimated by means of a transformed ADL model. By contrast, a cointegration relationship has 
been established between the interbank, deposit and policy rates, hence a non-linear error 
correction model has been used to detect adjustment process to long-run equilibrium. The 
estimated long-run as well as the short run interest rate pass-through of the selected policy rates 
to deposit and lending rates is weak and sluggish. Regarding the adjustment process of the bank 
rates, empirical results provided evidence that depending on the policy rate, the interbank, deposit 
and lending rates react differently following a negative and a positive shock in the policy rates. 
These results have been obtained using cointegration and asymmetric error-correction models.  
Keywords: Interest rate pass-through, monetary transmission mechanism, asymmetric adjustment.  
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I. Introduction 
The interest rate pass-through (IRPT) has received a great deal of attention in theoretical and 
empirical research on monetary policy making. However, while the bulk of the literature on the 
issue was devoted to industrial countries, it is only recently that a few studies focused on emerging 
and developing countries. The interest rate pass-through, defined as the extent to which changes 
on the policy rate are transmitted to bank retail interest rates, i.e. the deposit and lending rates, is 
a key element in the monetary transmission mechanism. Central banks use the policy rate to 
influence the short-term money market rates which in turn affect bank retail rates; in the end, 
banks’ decisions on the yield of their assets and liabilities affect the behavior of deposit holders 
and borrowers on savings, investment and consumption. A fuller and faster interest rate pass-
through enhances the effectiveness of monetary policy and improves the capacity of the central 
bank to achieve its macroeconomic goals of stabilizing aggregate output and prices. Therefore, the 
determination of the size and speed of the interest pass-through is crucial for the central bank to 
correctly calibrate its monetary policy stance. 
Various studies have investigated the interest transmission dynamics in different countries. The 
overall findings of these studies indicate that : the pass-through process is incomplete and 
sluggish, implying that changes in the policy rate are not passed on one to one to  bank retail rates 
and that the transmission takes time ; the size and speed of interest rate pass-through varies 
across countries and over time ; moreover , the interest pass-through varies depending on the 
bank rates considered and the bank products (Cottarelli ,Ferri and Generale ,1995; Mojon ,2000; 
De Bondt, 2002 ; Sander and Kleimeier , 2004 ). In addition, it was observed that the adjustment of 
the bank retail interest rates may be asymmetric, meaning that the reaction of the bank rates to 
policy rate shocks is different depending on whether the innovation in the policy rate is positive or 
negative ( De Bondt , 2002 ; Sander and Kleimeier ,2006 ; Karagianis ,Panagopoulos and Vlamis , 
2010). 
A good understanding of the responsiveness of the bank retail and interbank rates to changes in 
the policy rates is particularly important in Rwanda, given that banks are the predominant financial 
institutions in collecting savings and providing loans to firms and households and are consequently 
the main conduit of monetary policy impulses to the real economy. This paper follows the above 
line of research and examines in the case of Rwanda how effectively the innovations in the policy 
rates are transmitted to bank retail and interbank rates and whether the interest rate pass-through 
is symmetric or asymmetric , using the most recently available data and appropriate methodology.  
Research problem and motivation 
Most empirical studies on the interest pass-through have been concentrated on developed 
countries and some emerging countries of Latin America, Europe and Asia, while the literature on 
the issue for Sub-Saharan African countries remains scanty. Regarding Rwanda, the issue did not 
attract much attention until recently as the monetary authorities envisaged to adopt the inflation 
targeting regime in a near future for the conduct of monetary policy. 
In Rwanda, as in many other African countries, the monetary policy framework and the financial 
environment have undergone significant reforms in the last two decades resulting in the 
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abolishment of direct credit controls, the liberalization of bank interest rates and the removal of 
barriers to entry in the banking profession, while the Central Bank adopted the indirect and market 
based instruments for conducting monetary policy. However, despite the changing financial 
environment which was expected to have a significant impact on the interest pass-through and by 
implication on the effectiveness of monetary policy, no systematic investigation was carried out to 
assess the effects of the reforms on the interest rate pass-through. This study intends to fill the 
gap. 
While some studies examined the monetary transmission mechanism in Rwanda (Davoodi, Dixit 
and Pinter, 2013; Kigabo, Munyankindi and Amahoro, 2008), only one recent study by Kigabo, 
Mwenese and Bagabe (2016) focused on the interest pass-through in Rwanda using the single 
equation and the autoregressive distributed lag model (ADL) with monthly interest rate series 
covering the period 2008-2015. The overall finding of this study is that the long-run and short run 
effect of changes in the Treasury bill rate on lending and deposit rates of different maturities is 
incomplete.  
Compared to the paper by Kigabo, Mwenese and Bagabe (2016), the contribution of the present 
study is threefold. Firstly, this study not only examines the interest rate pass-through in Rwanda, 
but it is  the first attempt to investigate the possibility of asymmetries in the dynamic adjustment of 
the bank retail rates in response to changes in the policy rates using cointegration and asymmetric 
error-correction model approach (Scholnick, 1996; Sander and Kleimeier; 2002) Secondly, in 
addition to the Treasury bill rate used as policy rate in the aforementioned paper, the present study 
examines the pass-through from the repo rate, which will provide empirical evidence of the relative 
effectiveness of each instrument in the transmission of policy rate changes to bank retail rates. 
Thirdly, the pass-through from policy rate to interbank rate has been investigated since it is the first 
step of the entire pass-through process.  
Objective of the study 
The primary objective of this research is to analyze the interest pass-through mechanism in 
Rwanda; more specifically, this study aims to:  
-determine the size and speed of the pass-through between the policy and bank rates 
 in the long run and short run ;  
-examine whether the short-run interest rate adjustment dynamics is symmetric or asymmetric; 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a brief overview of the theoretical 
and empirical literature on the interest pass-through; section 3 highlights the main features of 
financial development and monetary policy framework in Rwanda; section 4 presents the data 
used and the modelling methodology; section 5 provides and discusses the empirical results of the 
research; section 6 concludes and summarizes the policy implications of the study. 
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II. Literature review 
What are the factors explaining the bank retail rates stickiness when they adjust to changes in the 
policy rates? Answering this question posed major challenges to policy makers and economists 
with regard to the effectiveness of monetary policy. It also gave rise to many studies seeking to 
provide convincing explanation for stickiness in bank retail rates adjustment.  
2.1. Theoretical review 
Theoretically the factors that may affect the bank interest rates responsiveness to changes in the 
policy rate are various; they include but are not limited to the following: structure and ownership of 
the financial system, collusive behavior of banks, menu and switching costs, asymmetric 
information and macroeconomic conditions. 
The structure of the financial system is a major determinant of the interest rate pass-through and 
refers to the number of market players, the degree of competition and bank concentration, the 
ownership structure, the level of development and openness of financial markets (Cottarelli and 
Kourelis, 1994). Cottarelli and Kourelis argued that the demand elasticity for loans is weaker in 
markets where there are a small number of competitors, high barriers to entry or no alternative 
sources of financing; consequently, in such markets, loan rates tend to react sluggishly to 
dynamics in the money market and policy rates in the short run. In contrast, a well-developed 
financial market with domestic bond and money markets, corporate debt securities and capital 
venture together with openness to international capital markets, result in a faster pass-through 
(Aziakpono and Wilson, 2010).  
On the other hand, concentration introduces rigidity in the interest pass-through, as banks tend to 
adopt an oligopolistic behavior, causing the interest rates to adjust asymmetrically. Two competing 
theories have been proposed by Hannan and Berger (1991), Neumark and Sharpe (1992) to 
explain asymmetries in the adjustment of the bank retail rates: the collusive pricing behavior of 
banks and the adverse customer reaction hypothesis.  
The collusive pricing behavior of banks argues that deposit rates will be rigid upwards following an 
increase in the policy rate because an increase in the deposit rate constitutes an additional cost for 
banks in the form of a higher payment to depositors, while the lending rates will exhibit greater 
rigidity downwards in reaction to a reduction in the policy rate because a reduction in the lending 
rate negatively affects the profit margin of banks. Conversely, the adverse customer reaction 
behavior suggests that deposit rates will be sticky downwards in the event of a decrease in the 
policy rate, whereas the lending rate will show greater rigidity upwards when the policy rate 
increases. 
The ownership structure of the financial system also plays a central role when it comes to the 
transmission of monetary policy (Espinosa-Vega and Rebucci, 2003; Amarasekara, 2005). In 
economies where state-owned financial institutions (banks and non-banks) are predominant in the 
financial markets, those institutions are instrumental in achieving policy objectives of governments 
and maximizing profit is not their primary constraint. In such an environment, interest rates are 
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likely to adjust with delay due to inefficiencies and political considerations, hence causing 
stickiness in interest rate adjustment. 
According to Rotemberg and Saloner (1987), price rigidity in response to changes in the 
underlying market conditions may be explained by “menu costs” which include the costs of 
changing and circulating the new price lists, printing, advertising, communicating changes to 
customers. The menu costs theory predicts that firms will adjust their prices only when the benefits 
from adjusting are greater than the cost of being out of equilibrium. Moreover, firms need to 
maintain a long term relationship with their customers and therefore do not want to continually alter 
their prices because this might have a negative impact on customer’s satisfaction. In line with this 
theoretical view, banks may delay before responding to changes in the policy rate (Cottarrelli and 
Kourelis, 1994). 
When a customer decides to move from a bank or a financial product to another in order to obtain 
more favorable conditions, he is exposed to the so called “switching costs”, referring mainly to 
search and transaction costs, which include the information cost to discover a bank with more 
favorable rates, the cost of learning different rates and conditions on the new loans or deposits. 
Given these considerations, the higher the switching costs, the more difficult it will be for the 
customer to move from a bank to another; as a result of the customer’s behavior, the bank retail 
interest rate will become sticky (Lowe and Rohling, 1992). 
In their insightful study, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) relate bank retail rates stickiness to asymmetric 
information in loan market. If banks increase their lending rates, they may attract riskier borrowers 
(adverse selection) while the increase of lending rates will give poor quality borrowers incentives to 
choose riskier projects (moral hazard). Consequently, banks will prefer to set lending rates below 
the market clearing rates and ration the amount of credit supply even if the funding costs increase. 
Thus, the authors have shown that in markets with imperfect information, the equilibrium in the 
loan market is characterized by credit rationing and the prevailing lending rates will not necessarily 
be altered following changes in other interest rates, including the policy rate; in such an 
environment, the lending rates will exhibit rigidity to upward stimulus. 
Macroeconomic conditions have also an important impact on the size of the pass-through and 
adjustment speed of the bank interest rates. Banks find it easier to quicker pass on changes in the 
policy rate to their lending and deposit rates during favorable economic conditions characterized 
by rapid economic growth and stability (Egert and MacDonald, 2009). On the contrary, a higher 
degree of volatility in the policy and money market rates (mirroring high macroeconomic instability 
and uncertainty), reduces the information content of the policy signals and hence, makes it harder 
for banks to disentangle noise from policy signals; this weakens the interest rate pass-through, 
given that banks will wait longer before changing their rates (Egert,Crespo-Cuaresma and 
Reininger, 2007). 
2.2. Empirical review 
Empirical works on the interest rate pass-through are relatively new in economic literature as early 
studies emerged only in the 1990s. In a logit modelling framework Hannan and Berger (1991) 
investigated the adjustment of prices in the US banking market over the period 1983-1986, 
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focusing on deposit rates and the issue of asymmetry. Their findings show that price rigidity is 
significantly greater in market characterized by high level of concentration and deposit rates are 
significantly more rigid when the stimulus for a change is upward rather than downward.  
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) used an autoregressive distributed lag model and aggregate time 
series to analyze the degree of lending rate stickiness in response to changes in money market 
rates in 31 selected industrial and developing countries. Their empirical results revealed a sluggish 
and incomplete adjustment in the lending rates following a shock in the money market rates and 
showed that the pass-through is higher in the long-term than in the short-term. They further 
explained that structural features of the financial system, such as capital controls, poor bank 
competition, barriers to entry, degree of development and openness of financial markets are the 
factors that weaken the interest rate pass-through.  
More recent works investigated the bank interest rates stickiness and explored the possibility of 
asymmetric adjustment in developed countries. De Bondt (2005) used a vector error-correction 
model to measure the pass-through from the overnight rate to deposit and lending rates in the 
Euro area in the period 1996-2001. He observed that the short run pass-through for both deposit 
and lending rates is incomplete, while in the long run, the pass-through to lending rates is 
complete, but is incomplete for deposit rates. Andries (2012) assessed the interest rate pass-
through dynamics in the European countries over the period 1993-2002 using the bounds testing 
approach for co-integration. His econometric results revealed that the bank retail rates adjustment 
following monetary impulses is sluggish, implying that banks dampen monetary policy shocks; 
there is a limited short run pass-through for different bank products and important discrepancies 
across countries have been identified; the long run pass-through is higher for interest rates on 
loans of shorter maturity and greater for interest rates on loans compared to interest rates on 
deposits; there is a marked heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment across European countries .  
Karagiannis, Panagopoulos and Vlamis (2010) used a disaggregated general to specific (GETS) 
model to analyze the short-run and long-run interest rate pass-through in the Euro area and the 
US. Their findings indicate mixed results for the size and adjustment speed of the interest pass-
through. For the Euro area, evidence suggests that changes in the money market rate are more 
influential than changes in Central Bank rate. There is a complete pass-through from money 
market to deposit rates and incomplete pass-through from money market rate to lending rates. For 
the US, the empirical results suggest that there is a complete and significant pass-through from the 
Central bank rate to both lending and deposit rates. Moreover, the size of the adjustment 
parameter for upward adjustment is quite higher. It appears that there exists no pass-through from 
money market rate to either bank retail rates in the US, implying that the Central bank rate is more 
effective. For the Euro area, there is a negative asymmetry for deposit rates, meaning that banks 
transmit only negative changes to depositors; in contrast, a positive asymmetry was found for loan 
rates, suggesting that banks tend to pass more of the increases in money market to lenders than 
the decreases.  
A growing number of studies on the interest rates stickiness in emerging and developing countries 
have yielded mixed results. The burst of interest for these studies resulted from the move to 
inflation targeting regimes in many emerging and developing in the mid-2000s and the adoption of 
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market-oriented instruments in the conduct of monetary policy which enhanced the role of the 
interest rate (Mohanty and Turner, 2008). These studies intended to understand and explain the 
persistence of interest rate rigidity and higher interest spread, even though financial reforms and 
liberalization were implemented in most emerging and developing countries.  
An early study to be mentioned is that of Scholnick (1996) who found evidence of asymmetries in 
the interest rate adjustment for Malaysia and Singapore. Employing co-integration and non-linear 
error-correction model, his results showed that deposit rates in both countries are more rigid when 
adjusting upwards than downwards.  
Egert, Crespo-Cuaresma and Reininger (2007) compared the interest rate pass-through in five 
Central and Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia-CEE-5), and three Euro area countries (Austria, Germany and Spain) selected as 
benchmarks. Using a multivariate vector auto-regression, this paper investigated the relationship 
between the policy rate and the bank retail rates on the one hand, the market and retail rates on 
the other hand. The study showed that the pass-through estimates vary from a country to another 
depending on the bank product; the pass-through is generally slow for overnight deposits, but 
becomes significantly higher from short to long term deposit rates; corporate lending rates are 
much more responsive to changes in the policy rate than deposit or household loan rates. In most 
cases, it was impossible to detect any co-integration relationship between the variables used.  
Tai, Sek and Har (2012) assessed the pass-through from monetary policy rate to deposit and 
lending rates in Asian countries by running Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) with data 
covering the period 1988-2010.The results of the paper revealed that: the pass-through from the 
policy rate to deposit and lending rates in short and long run is generally small and slow except for 
Malaysia, Hong Kong and Singapore where it is considerably higher and varies over time. In 
addition, it was also found that even though Korea, Philippines and Thailand adopted the inflation 
targeting regime and used the short term interest rate as the main monetary policy instrument, the 
interest rate adjustment remained sticky. Tai, Sek and Har argue that the faster transmission of the 
monetary policy stance in Malaysia, Hong Kong and Singapore may be explained by the 
improvement in efficiency of the banking system, the availability of alternative sources of financing 
and the increase of financial openness. 
Cas , Menendez and Frantischek (2011) examined the strength of the pass-through in five Central 
American countries, the CADR-5 (Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua) and six Latin American countries, the LA-6 (Brazil ,Chile ,Colombia, Mexico , Peru and 
Uruguay) taken as benchmarks , given their relatively more developed monetary policy 
frameworks. Panel estimation method with data covering the period 2004-2010 was employed to 
measure the pass-through from policy rate to lending rates. The main finding of the study was that 
the pass-through from policy rate to lending rates is generally weaker and slower in the CADR-5 
countries than in the LA-6 countries. Factors influencing the interest rate adjustment include 
exchange rate flexibility, financial system development, independence and transparency of central 
banks, dollarization and bank concentration.  
Studies that explored interest rate pass-through in Sub-Saharan African countries are scanty. 
Jankee’s (2005) work on interest rate pass-through in Mauritius is the earliest attempt. He used the 
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Johansen co-integration approach, TAR and M-TAR models to examine how changes in the 
interbank rate were transmitted to lending and deposit rates during the period 1988-2003.This 
work concluded that the long run pass-through was incomplete in Mauritius for deposit as well as 
for lending rates. Asymmetry was found only for lending rates, which exhibited faster adjustment to 
negative than to positive shocks in the interbank rate. Acheampong (2005) found incomplete long-
run pass-through of changes in money market rate to lending and deposit rates in Ghana using co-
integration and error correction model with data covering the period 1994-2004. In addition, his 
findings supported evidence of symmetry in the adjustment of lending and deposit rates to 
changes in the money market rate. Acheampong argued that low competition, dependence on 
bank loans, interest inelasticity, contract maturity and menu costs could account for the high 
degree of interest stickiness. 
Sanusi (2010) employed impulse reaction functions from a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) 
to derive the dynamic elasticities of the pass-through of monetary policy and interbank interest 
rates to lending and deposit rates in Nigeria for the period 2002-2010. His empirical results may be 
summarized as follows: the pass-through is incomplete and slow for both deposit and lending 
rates; the pass-through of the policy rate to interbank rate is substantially higher and faster than to 
deposit and lending rates. The pass-through to money market rates increased significantly after 
the consolidation of the banking sector, while the pass-through to bank retail rates decreased 
relatively to the pre-consolidation period. Sanusi argued that these results are an indication that 
the consolidation of the banking sector and the reforms in the financial system succeeded in 
improving the efficiency in the money market but failed to remove the distortions in the retail loan 
and deposit rates market.  
Samba and Yan (2010) examined the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the countries of 
the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC) focusing on the pass-through 
from the policy rate to long term interest rates. They used data spanning the period 1990-2007 in 
an autoregressive distribution lag (ADL) framework. Several finding emerge from this study: the 
short run pass-through is higher in the lending rates than in the deposit rates. The long-run pass-
through from the policy rate to deposit rates is incomplete, while the pass-through to lending rates 
exhibits an overshooting effect in response to change in the policy rate. The study supports the 
evidence of asymmetric adjustment for both deposit and lending rates. For lending rates, the 
adjustment coefficient is lower in the cycle of increasing policy rate, while there is an overshooting 
reaction in the decreasing cycle. Regarding the deposit rates, the adjustment speed is higher in 
the cycle of increasing policy rate than in the decreasing cycle. Samba and Yan argue that the 
absence of competition in the banking sector, combined with excess liquidity in CAEMC countries 
may help to explain the upward rigidity of deposit rates. At the same time, the overshooting 
reaction of lending rates may reflect the creditors’ overreaction facing higher rates, in order to 
hedge their risks against uncertainty and under developed financial markets.  
In their paper, Sande and Okello (2013) investigate the pass-through dynamics in Uganda, 
employing bivariate co-integration method and the associated error correction model with data 
covering the period 2005-2012.They relate the interbank rate to policy rate ( repo rate) on the one 
hand , and the deposit and lending rates to policy rate , on the other hand. In summary, their 
findings are the following. The long run pass-through coefficient from the policy rate to interbank 
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rate is greater than one, implying an overshooting pass-through, while it is incomplete for time 
deposit and lending rates. Likewise, the size of the pass-through of policy rate to saving and 
demand deposit is incomplete. Regarding the short-run adjustment process towards equilibrium, 
the estimates of the error-correction models for the interbank and bank retail rates point to a 
sluggish adjustment. From these results, Sande and Okello conclude that the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism is effective only for the wholesale interest rates, while it is ineffective for 
retail rates, meaning that the change in the policy rate is not fully transmitted to the retail rates; the 
low speed of adjustment to equilibrium is also an indication of the ineffectiveness of monetary 
policy to influence the banks’ pricing decisions. 
III. Financial development and monetary policy in Rwanda 
3.1. Structure and development of the financial system  
The analysis of the interest rate pass-through in Rwanda requires a good understanding of how 
the banking sector structure and the financial market developments may influence the behavior of 
bank interest rates. The banking market structure refers to the number and size of banks, while 
financial development focuses on the existence of diversified debt instruments in the financial 
market  providing alternative financing and saving opportunities. Existing literature documented 
that high concentration in the banking sector could reduce the degree of competition among 
commercial banks and have a negative impact on the interest rate pass-through (Di, 2014); in 
contrast, the development of the financial system strengthens the interest rate transmission 
mechanism as more alternative sources of capital increase the elasticity of demand for bank loans 
(Cottarelli, Ferri and Generale, 1995). 
The financial sector in Rwanda has undergone important economic reforms during the two last 
decades. The reforms whose ultimate objective was to set up a sound and competitive financial 
system included: deregulation of interest rates, removal of credit controls, removing bank entry 
barriers, bank privatization and recapitalization, entrenchment of indirect monetary control 
instruments, development of money and capital markets, strengthening bank supervision and 
regulation and liberalization of foreign exchange markets. These reforms were part of a global 
liberalization process whereby the management of the economy shifted from a state-controlled to a 
market oriented economy relying on private sector .These changes which occurred during the 
1990s and 2000s were implemented through successive economic adjustment and stabilization 
programs supported by international development partners of Rwanda 
As a result of the above reforms, the structure and the volume of activities of the financial sector 
changed drastically. In the 1980s, the financial sector in Rwanda consisted of the National Bank of 
Rwanda(Central Bank),three commercial banks , one mortgage bank, one development bank ,one 
public insurance company , one public pension fund and a network of cooperatives working as a 
credit union. As at end December 2016, the banking sector is comprised of sixteen (16) banks, 
while the non-bank financial institutions include fifteen (15) insurance companies, 472 
microfinance institutions and one (1) public pension fund (NBR, August 2017).  
The other component of the financial sector is the capital market where long term debt instruments 
are traded. The capital market in Rwanda mainly consisting of Government T-Bonds is at an early 
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stage of development. Since the creation of the Capital market in 2011, outstanding Government 
and corporate bonds worth RWF 227 billion have been issued (Table 3), representing a mere 3.6% 
of GDP as at end 2016. It appears that so far, the capital market in Rwanda cannot compete with 
the banking system in providing funding and saving opportunities to the public. 
Despite the presence of more participants in the financial sector, the banking system remains 
overwhelmingly the most predominant segment in the sector in Rwanda. As at December 2016, 
the banking system accounts for 66.9% of the total assets of the financial sector while the share of 
microfinance institutions and other non-bank financial institutions is 6.3% and 26.8 % respectively 
(NBR, August 2017).The share of the banks in financial intermediation is even stronger, as the 
banking system accounts for more than 90% of the loan and deposit markets. The banking sector 
is not only predominant, but also not competitive as illustrated by the persistence of large interest 
rate spreads (Figures 1 and 2). Another sign of low competition in the Rwandan banking sector is 
the high degree of liquidity preference. It has been shown in Kigabo, Mwenese and Bagabe (2016) 
that the liquidity preference curve for the banking sector in Rwanda becomes perfectly elastic at 
around 16%. Under a perfectly competitive loan market, excess liquidity and bank loans should 
become substitutes at a zero loan rate. The fact that they are substitutes at such a high rate is a 
clear indication that the banking sector is not competitive (Khemraj, 2007).  
Another feature of the Rwandan banking sector is its relative concentration, suggesting that banks 
have been able to exert mark power over their clients and behaved in an oligopolistic manner. The 
National Bank of Rwanda noted however that the degree of concentration was significantly 
reduced in the last ten years as the share of the three largest banks in loans, deposits and total 
assets declined from 62.7%, 70.6% and 66% in 2006 to 44%, 47% and 45% respectively in June 
2016 (NBR, July 2015-June 2016).  
It has been widely documented that in a situation where firms and households depend on bank 
loans for their activities owing to underdeveloped money and capital markets, banks feel less 
pressurized to align their lending rates to the corresponding market conditions (Acheampong, 
2005). In the case of Rwanda, alternative sources of debt such as credit from equity and bond 
markets are almost inexistent because Rwanda’s security and money markets lack sufficient 
products and services suitable for majority of small and medium enterprises as well as for 
individuals. In such a context, bank retail rates may be unresponsive to monetary policy actions 
from the Central Bank due to the inelasticity of demand for loans. The policy implication of the 
structure of the financial system in Rwanda is that the banks predominance will lead to a low and 
sluggish interest rate pass-through. 
 3.2. Monetary policy framework  
As in most African countries until the end of the 1980s, the financial sector in Rwanda functioned 
according to the McKinnon-Shaw financial repression paradigm characterized by government 
restrictions on the operations of financial system such as direct interest rate controls, credit 
ceilings and high reserve requirement.  
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While control of credit extension and high reserve requirement entailed inefficiency in the 
allocation of financial resources, interest rates ceiling hampered the channeling of savings in the 
banking system.  
In order to set up a sound and competitive financial system with the view to ensuring an efficient 
mobilization and allocation of financial resources, credit controls were removed in 1992 and 
interest rates were fully liberalized in 1996. 
With the introduction of the money market operations in 1998, the NBR adopted the monetary 
targeting regime framework for the conduct of monetary policy with the use of indirect market 
based instruments to control overall monetary and credit conditions through the demand and 
supply of liquidity in the banking system. These instruments included: reserve requirement, 
discount rate, open market operations and interventions in the foreign exchange market.  
Regarding the exchange rate policy, it is worth mentioning that policy changes focused on setting 
up a flexible exchange rate regime. In December 1998, Rwanda has accepted the obligations of 
the IMF’s article VII, sections 2, 3 and 4 and since then maintained an exchange rate system free 
of restrictions on payments and transfers for international transactions, making the Rwandan 
currency convertible (Government of Rwanda , 1998). Currently, as a result of successive 
revisions of the foreign exchange regulations, operations relating to imports and exports, services 
and capital account including direct and portfolio investments, lending in foreign currencies and 
personal transactions have been fully liberalized (Official Gazette N0.44 of 04/11/2013).  
Flexible exchange rate regime such as the one adopted by the National Bank of Rwanda allows  
the country to enjoy a greater autonomy in terms of setting domestic monetary policy 
(Frankel,1999) and as argued by Cas ,Menendez and Frantischek (2011), the interest rate pass-
through is positively associated with exchange rate flexibility.  
During the period covered by this study, the National Bank of Rwanda has been using the 
following monetary policy instruments: the Discount rate, the Cash reserve requirement and the 
Open market operations. However, the role of the discount rate and the reserve requirement has 
been progressively minimized and market determined instruments have been favored to regulate 
the amount of liquidity in the money market through the open market operations, namely the 
Treasury bill rate and the Repo rate. Since the introduction of the repo operations in 2008, the key 
repo rate (policy rate) which is announced on a quarterly basis has been used to signal the 
monetary policy stance of the National Bank of Rwanda, while the repo transactions have been 
employed in the open market operations as the main instruments to inject or absorb liquidity in the 
banking system. These operations involve the repo rate which is the rate at which commercial 
banks can obtain funds from the Central bank, while the reverse repo rate is the rate at which 
commercial banks can invest their surplus funds in Government securities. Therefore by altering 
the Key repo rate and the Repo rate, the National Bank of Rwanda signals its monetary policy 
stance which is transmitted to interbank rates and other money market rates and ultimately to bank 
retail rates.  
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To illustrate the developments in the money and financial markets in Rwanda in recent years, the 
main operations are summarized in Table 3 where the volume of transactions for each debt 
instrument is presented. 
Table 3: Developments in domestic financial markets (in millions of RWF) 
Assets 2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016 
Interbank 549,044 518,095 395.0       - 145,800 224,800 242,500 444,953 
Treasury bills - 54,462 64,294 95,256 156,200 172,300 225,100 177,700 
Repurchase 
agreements 
(repos) 
 
58,100 
 
106,800 
 
114,900 
 
52,450 
 
29,500 
 
47,500 
 
26,500 
 
30,500 
Government 
T-bonds 
- 15,000 15,000 10,000 18,500 42,500 55,000 55,000 
Corporate 
bonds 
1,000       -      -      -       - 15,000      -     - 
Source: NBR, Financial Markets Department 
As shown in Table 3,the money and capital markets in Rwanda are dominated by the short term 
money market instruments including interbank transactions reflecting the volume of liquidity traded 
between banks,  the Repo and T-Bill operations which are short term debt instruments used by the 
Central bank to regulate liquidity in the banking system. It is worth noting that transactions in repo 
agreements witnessed an upward trend between 2009 and 2011 reflecting a tighter monetary 
policy implemented by the National Bank of Rwanda, while a relaxed monetary policy stance was 
observed between 2012 and 2016. In contrast, the volume of T-Bill operations exhibits a different 
pattern as the transactions have been on the rise from 2010 to 2016, reflecting banks’ investments 
in Government securities of longer maturities. As also can be seen in Table 3, the issuance of 
longer term debt instruments, namely, Government T-Bonds has been intensified since 2014 in a 
bid to promote and strengthen the capital market development and improve the monetary 
transmission mechanism in Rwanda.  
3.3. Interest rate developments  
Before engaging in a rigorous analysis based upon econometric technique, it is instructive to look 
at the behavior of the key variables during the sample period, namely the bank and the policy 
rates. To this effect, the developments of the short term lending rates (LRSHT), the three months 
maturity deposit rate (DR-3m), the interbank rate (INTBAN), the Repo rate and the three months 
maturity Treasury bill rate (Tbr-3m) are depicted in Figure 1,while the developments of the long 
term lending rate (LRLOT) , the interbank rate , the six months maturity deposit rate (DR-6m), the 
Repo rate  and the six months maturity Treasury bill rate (Tbr-6m) are displayed in Figure 2 .A 
common feature to be pointed out in the two figures is that, there is a consistently large spread 
between the lending and deposit rates, suggesting that during the sample period, there have been 
no efficiency gains in the banking system in Rwanda pointing to persistence of a non-competitive 
market . 
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Figure 1: LRSHT, DR-3m, Repo rate, Tbr-3m and INTBAN 
 
It is worth noting that during almost the whole period covered by this study, the banking system 
was characterized by excess liquidity, resulting notably from the expansion of public spending 
reflecting the scaling up of foreign aid to Rwanda, so that the different monetary policy instruments 
were used by the Central Bank to drain this excess liquidity by reducing banks’ reserves.  
It may be observed in Figures 1 and 2 that except for the year 2009 marked by the credit crunch 
and 2010 characterized by comfortable liquidity conditions in the banking system, the lending rates 
(short and long-term) were fairly stable and varied within a narrow range, while the deposit rates, 
the Treasury bill and the repo rates were more volatile and displayed stronger fluctuations. This 
contrasting behavior of the lending and other rates whereby lending rates seem to follow an 
independent development path, may be explained by the fact that the lending rates are 
unresponsive to changes in the policy rates because they are determined by factors other than the 
cost of funds, while the deposit rates are sensitive to changes in the policy rates and exhibit similar 
developments. As stated by the National Bank of Rwanda in a recent policy document, the weak 
responsiveness of the lending rates to changes in the key repo rate is due to, among other factors, 
high operating costs in the banking sector and high provisions for bad loans. In addition, behavior 
of borrowers such as lack of information on loan conditions and culture of not bargaining with 
banks contributed to the rigidities in lending rates charged by banks (NBR, February 2015).  
Despite their higher volatility, the deposit, interbank and policy rates exhibit a regular co-movement 
suggesting a long-run relationship between these rates; this co-movement is discernible in Figures 
1 and 2. During the sample period, monetary policy has been actively used to cope with a variety 
of challenges stemming from domestic and external shocks. The shocks caused by global food 
and fuel crisis in 2008 resulted in higher inflation rising to more than 20% by end 2008. The 
National Bank of Rwanda responded to these developments with a tighter monetary policy by 
raising the policy rate in mid-2008. However, by end 2008 and early 2009, following the world 
economic slowdown and a domestic liquidity crisis in the banking system, the Rwandan economy 
experienced a sharp decrease in the growth of banks’ credit to private sector from 32% in 2008 to 
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4% in 2009. As a result the Central Bank relaxed the monetary policy stance to curb the decline in 
broad money and credit to private sector. The ensuing accommodative monetary policy meant to 
improve banks’ liquidity and stimulate credit to economy included the cut of the key repo rate from 
9% in December 2009 to 7 % in early 2010. In subsequent years, the Central Bank implemented a 
prudent monetary policy to prevent risks of exacerbating inflation pressures resulting from rising 
inflation and uncertainties in the international and regional environment during the period 2011-
2013.  
Accommodative monetary policy was again implemented from the second half of 2013 through 
2014 to support the recovery of the economy from the slowdown registered in 2013. The monetary 
policy stance was further relaxed in 2015 as the National Bank of Rwanda reduced the key repo 
rate to 6.5% in a context of low inflation. This downward trend of the policy rate was reversed in 
2016 where money market rates have been increasing reflecting tighter liquidity conditions in the 
banking system in a context of economic slowdown. This change may also be explained by the 
interventions of the Central Bank in the foreign exchange market by selling US dollars to banks 
and the will of the monetary authorities to align the money market rates to the key repo rate so as 
to develop interbank market transactions (NBR, February 2017).  
A close examination of the developments of the deposit and interbank rates in Figures 1 and 2 
shows that the fluctuations of both rates follow closely the changes in the policy rates, i.e. the repo 
and Treasury bill rates, albeit with a lag.  
Figure 2: LRLOT, Dr-6m, Repo rate, Tbr-6m and INTBAN 
 
The responsiveness of the deposit and interbank rates to changes in the policy rate in the context 
of a global declining trend of the policy rates and relatively stable lending rates is consistent with 
the profit maximizing behavior of banks as the decline in the deposit rates increases the interest 
rate spread which contributes to the improvement of the banks’ profit margin.  
The foregoing analysis is an attempt to uncover the nature of the relationship between the bank 
rates and the policy rates in Rwanda. Overall, the visual inspection of the developments of the 
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different rates shows clearly that, lending rates are not sensitive to changes in the Repo and 
Treasury bill rates. Conversely, the deposit and interbank rates exhibit a closer relationship with 
the selected policy rates, suggesting that monetary policy actions have more influence on deposit 
and interbank rates than on lending rates. However, this preliminary assessment cannot provide 
convincing information on the real nature of the relationship between the bank rates and the policy 
rates; this task will be achieved through a rigorous econometric analysis. 
IV. Data and methodology 
4.1. Data 
The data used in this research consist of monthly series of two policy rates , namely the Treasury 
bill rate of different maturities (from one to six months : Tbr-1m,Tbr-3m and Tbr-6m ) and the Repo 
rate along with  three bank rates (interbank , deposit and lending rates) collected from tables 
published by the National Bank of Rwanda. Interbank rate denominated as INTBAN, deposit rates 
of different maturities (from one to six months: Dr-1m, Dr-3m and Dr-6m) and lending rates of 
short, medium and long term (LRSHT, LRMED and LRLOT) have been considered for analysis. 
The data cover the sample period 2008-1 to 2016-12. This period has been chosen for two main 
reasons. First, the repo rate has been introduced in 2008 as a new monetary policy instrument. 
Second, during this period, the main reforms in the financial sector had been completed and the 
Central Bank had gained its full independence and relied more on the interest rate for conducting 
monetary policy. The choice of policy variables can be motivated as follows. In the current 
monetary policy framework, the key repo rate is the instrument used to signal the monetary policy 
stance of the National Bank of Rwanda. However, the key repo rate is announced on a quarterly 
basis and may remain unchanged for long time periods, which makes it less suitable for 
econometric purposes. By contrast, the Repo rate is dynamic since it is used by the National Bank 
of Rwanda in the open market operations as the main instrument to signal the financial conditions 
in the money markets on a daily basis; therefore, the Repo rate is considered as the main policy 
rate in this study. The Treasury bill rate of different maturities has also been used as policy rate 
since it has been argued in the literature that in the long-run, banks set their retail prices in line 
with their marginal cost, i.e. the funding cost on loans and opportunity cost of deposits, which can 
be best estimated by money market rates reflecting market conditions (De Bondt, 2005).  
4.2. Methodology 
i). Conceptual framework 
The theoretical analysis of the interest rate pass-through starts with a good understanding of the 
banks’ price setting behavior in the determination of their lending and deposit rates in the presence 
of monetary policy shocks. The price charged by banks is indeed crucial since it influences their 
profitability and the soundness of the banking system, which in turn enhances financial stability. 
The oligopolistic version of the Monti-Klein model of bank profit maximization theory implying 
imperfect competition in the banking market has been extensively used to explain the link between 
the policy rate and the bank retail rates (Makambi, Wawire and Omolo, 2013 and Mbowe, 2015). 
The present study relies on the same approach as the Rwandan banking system may be 
considered as an oligopolistic market. As presented in Makambi, Wawire and Omolo (2013), under 
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the Monti-Klein model, each bank is assumed to have direct clearing relationships with the Central 
Bank and seeks to maximize profit (π), subject to its balance sheet. The balance sheet of the bank 
is comprised of loans (L) and reserves (R) on the assets side and deposits (D) and settlement 
balance (S) with the Central Bank on the liabilities side,  so that : 
R+L=D+S…………………………………………………………………………………                     (1) 
It also follows that from equation (1) that total deposits may be presented as: 
D=R+L-S……………………………………………………………………………                              (2) 
Assuming that a commercial bank extends loans at a rate iL and pays interest rate iD on deposits, it 
follows that the net interest income (NII) of the bank is given by the difference between the total 
interest earned on loans and the total interest expense paid to deposit holders : 
NII = iLL- iD (R+L-S)………………………………………………………………                               (3) 
Clearing operations with other banks are conducted via the Central bank and commercial banks 
whose balance is negative pay a liquidity penalty equivalent to a punitive interest rate, iP, known as 
the policy rate multiplied by the difference between the settlement balance and the required 
reserves at the Central bank, which gives the following total penalty equal to: 
iPδ(S-R) …………………………………………………………                                                       (4)  
The commercial bank also incurs costs of managing loans. Taking this cost function as given by μL 
and using the Monti-Klein model which assumes that banks are confronted with a downward 
sloping demand function for loans and an upward sloping function for deposits, the profit 
maximization function, π (L, R), derived from the combination of equations (3) and (4), may be 
expressed as the sum of the intermediation margins on loans and deposits minus the liquidity 
penalty and the management costs of loans as follows: 
π (L,R) =  iLL - iD (R+L-S) - δiP (S-R) - μL……………………………………………                      (5) 
The bank’s decision variables in the model are the volume of loans granted and the quantity of 
precautionary reserves it chooses to hold and profit maximizing bank equates its marginal revenue 
to marginal cost. Therefore, computing the first order conditions from the above profit maximization 
function by differentiating equation (5) with respect to L and R, and setting the results equal to zero 
yields: 
iL - iD - μ = 0……………………………………………………………………………                       (6) 
and  
- iD + δiP = 0…………………………………………………………………………                          (7) 
From equation (6) and (7), it follows that iL - iD = μ and   iD = δiP, implying that  
iL = δiP + μ ………………………………………………………… ………………                          (8)  
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Thus, the Monti-Klein model demonstrates that there is a linear relationship between the policy 
rate and the bank retail rates and shows how changes in the policy rate may be transmitted to 
bank retail rates; equation (8) formed the basis of the interest rate pass-through analysis in the 
empirical literature. Nonetheless, the above model may be criticized on the ground that , first, 
banks are not bound to borrow from the Central bank and pay a penalty rate and, second, 
developments of bank retail rates do not necessarily reflect the behavior of the policy rate. The 
policy rate is indeed a very short-term rate, while lending and deposit rates are expected to reflect 
long-term rates; furthermore, banks may obtain funds from a variety of sources, including retail 
deposits, interbank, bonds and Treasury bill markets (Illes, Lombardi and Mizen, 2015). Hence, 
using the policy rate to measure the interest rate pass-through would lead to erroneous conclusion 
on the interest pass-through process. De Bondt, Mojon and Valla (2005), De Bondt (2002) argue 
that in the long-run, banks set their retail prices in line with their marginal costs, i.e. the funding 
cost on loans and the opportunity cost of deposits, which can be best estimated by money market 
rates reflecting market conditions. 
ii). Empirical model and estimation procedure 
In order to analyze the relationship between the policy rates and the bank rates and measure the 
size and speed of the interest rate pass-through in Rwanda, autoregressive distributed lag model 
(ADL), co-integration technique, non-linear error correction models have been be used. Using non-
linear error correction model allows testing for differences in the bank rates adjustment when they 
are below or above their equilibrium level following a positive or negative shock in the policy rates.  
To conduct the above analysis, the following basic model for interest rate pass-through proposed 
by De Bondt (2005) has been used:  
brt = b0 + b1prt + εt                                                                                                                        (9) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
where brt
 is the endogenously determined bank rate; prt denotes the policy rate assumed to be 
exogenous; εt is the stochastic error term of the model; b0 and b1 are the long run model 
parameters; b0 represents the constant markup and b1 measures the degree of pass-through in the 
long run. Equation (9) provides a primary model of bank pricing decisions from which to assess the 
sensitivity of the bank rates to changes in the policy rates and in so doing the strength and 
magnitude of the IRPT. If markets are perfect (i.e. full information and perfect competition), the 
coefficient b1 is expected to be equal to one, implying a complete long run pass-through or full 
transmission of monetary impulses to bank rates; in the context of imperfect markets, coefficient b1 
will be less than one, suggesting an incomplete interest rate pass-through or partial transmission 
of policy rate changes to bank rates. In fact , it is unlikely that the value of b1 will be equal to one 
not only due to imperfect markets , but also to a number of factors including fixed menu costs, 
asymmetric information, high switching costs , collusive behavior and adverse customer reaction 
(Egert and Macdonald ,2009 ; Aziakpono and Wilson, 2010). It has also been pointed out that b1 
could be higher than one, hence recording an overshooting pass-through; this may occur when 
banks charge higher interest rates in an attempt to offset higher risks resulting from asymmetric 
information rather than reducing the supply of loans de Bondt (2005). 
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The econometric technique to be used for estimating Equation (9) depends on the time series 
properties of the data. Therefore, a natural starting point of the analysis is to test all the variables 
for unit roots and determine their order of integration.  
If the time series of bank and policy rates are found to be stationary in level, Equation (9) may be 
estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) technique. If the data are integrated in level, but 
stationary in first difference, the series will be tested for cointegration. If the first difference 
stationary series are not cointegrated, then equation (9) will be estimated by the conventional ADL 
model: 
∆brt = b0 + b1Δprt +

n
i 1
bi ∆prt-i  +

m
i 1
ci ∆brt-i  + μt                                                                    (10) 
where ∆ denotes the first difference operator, b1 is the measure of the immediate pass-through 
while bi represents the short run pass-through reflected in the different lags of the policy rate, ci is 
the autoregressive coefficient of the lagged dependent variable , μt is the white noise error term, n 
and m are the optimal number of lags used in the model. From equation (10), the long-run pass-
through coefficients b1 in equation (9) can be computed as in Egert, Crespo-Cuaresma and 
Reininger (2007) and Kwapil and Scharler (2010): 
b1 =

n
i 1
bi   / (1-

m
i 1
ci )                                                                                                           (11)                                                                                                             
Keele and De Boef (2004) have also demonstrated that subject to some technical transformation, 
the conventional ADL may be used to generate an error-correction model with non-cointegrated 
stationary series. Thus, Keele and De Boef propose to estimate the following regression: 
∆rt = α0 + ρrt-1 + μ1∆prt + μ2prt-1 + εt                                                                                           (12)                                                                             
which can further be reparametrized in an error-correction model : 
∆rt = α0 + ρ (rt-1-μ2prt-1) + μ1∆1prt + εt                                                                                         (13)    
in which ρ is interpreted as the speed of adjustment towards equilibrium and μ1 captures the 
contemporaneous or immediate pass-through. The long-run parameters can be estimated from 
equation (12) as θ0 = α0/ ρ and θ2 = μ2/ ρ.  
If the time series of interest rates share a long-run relationship (i.e., cointegrated), this study will 
use a dynamic model referred to as the bounds test approach proposed by Pesaran, Shin and 
Smith (2001) for cointegration analysis:  
∆brt = α0+α1Δprt+γbrt-1+δprt-1+

n
i 1
αi∆prt-i + 

m
i 1
ci∆brt-i + μt                                                 (14) 
where α1 represents the immediate pass-through, γ and δ are the coefficients of the lagged level 
variables; ci is the autoregressive parameter, αi  represents the short run pass-through ; μt is an 
i.i.d process with zero mean and constant variance. 
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The bounds testing approach presents important advantages over the other existing techniques in 
modelling cointegration dynamics as it provides greater flexibility in relaxing the assumptions that 
the time series should be integrated of the same order , they can indeed be I(0) or I(1). The small 
sample properties of the bounds testing approach are superior to that of other cointegration testing 
approaches. Furthermore , as argued by Fuertes and Heffernan (2008) and Ahmad , Aziz and 
Rummun (2013), equation (14) can be estimated by OLS and yields unbiased and consistent 
measures of long run mark-up b0 and pass-through b1 of equation (9).  
Following the bounds testing approach, the presence of cointegration is detected by the 
implementation of the Wald coefficient restriction test (F-statistic) to the lagged level variables (brt-1 
and prt-1) in equation (14) and the null hypothesis of no cointegration is H0 : γ = δ = 0 against the 
alternative H1: γ ≠ δ ≠ 0. The computed F-test value is compared with the critical values tabulated 
in Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001). For a given level of significance, if the computed F-test statistic 
is smaller than the lower bound value, then the null hypothesis is not rejected; conversely if the 
computed F-test statistic is greater than the upper bound value, then the null hypothesis is 
rejected. On the other hand, if the computed F-statistic falls between the lower and upper values, 
then the result of the test is not conclusive. A significant F-test statistic for testing the joint 
significance of the lagged level variables indicates the existence of a long-run relationship and on 
the basis of equation (14) the long-run parameters of equation (9) can be calculated as β0 = - α0/γ 
and β1 = -δ/γ and the new long-run relationship equation is : 
brt = β0 + β1prt                                                                                                                            (15) 
To investigate the interest rate pass-through, the error correction mechanism (ECM) has been 
generally used in the literature. This methodology has the ability to quantify both the degree and 
speed of adjustment of the bank retail rates following a change in the policy rate. It also allows a 
distinction between the long-run relationship of the two variables and the short run adjustment 
towards their long-run equilibrium. On the basis of equation (14) this study derives an error 
correction model similar to that used by Sander and Kleimeir (2004), Aziakpono and Wilson (2010) 
to examine the short run and long-run dynamics of the bank retail rates in response to changes in 
the policy rate:  
∆brt = β0 + β1∆prt  + 

n
i 1
 βi ∆prt-i + 

m
i 1
λi ∆brt-I + φECTt-1 + ηt                                                             (16) 
where ∆ denotes the first difference operator, β1 is the measure of the immediate pass-through 
while βi represents the short run pass-through reflected in the different lags of the policy rate, λi is 
the autoregressive coefficient of the lagged dependent variable , ηt   is the white noise error term, n 
and m are the optimal number of lags used in the model. ECTt-1 (=brt -1 - β0 - β1prt-1) represents the 
error correction term lagged by one period obtained from the long-run relationship given by 
equation (15) and captures the extent of the disequilibrium at time (t-1); φ is the coefficient of the 
error correction term capturing the speed of adjustment of bank rates towards their long run 
equilibrium level and measures the portion of the disequilibrium that is corrected in the next period; 
if the coefficient φ is statistically significant and negative , it means that market forces are in 
operation to restore long run equilibrium after short run disturbances . 
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Equation (16) corresponds to the conventional linear error-correction model and implicitly assumes 
that the adjustment speed of the bank rates following a deviation from the long-run equilibrium 
represented by φ, is symmetric, meaning that it is the same following a positive or negative shock.  
However, the short run dynamics may be asymmetric, meaning that the speed of adjustment may 
be different depending on the strength and the direction of the shock. Fuertes, Heffernan and 
Kalotchou (2006), argue that due to structural shocks, exogenous and endogenous factors, the 
speed of adjustment may be asymmetric with respect to the magnitude and direction of monetary 
policy action. Therefore, it is important to relax the symmetric assumption in order to assess the 
true nature of the adjustment dynamics. To account for the potential asymmetry in the adjustment 
process, this study follows Scholnick (1996), Sander and Kleimeier (2002).The procedure consists 
of splitting the residuals obtained from the long-run relationship into two series of positive and 
negative residuals defined as follows:  
ECT+ = ECT if ECT ˃0                                                                                                                (17)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
ECT = 0 if ECT ˂ 0  
and   
ECT-= ECT if ECT˂0                                                                                                                  (18)                                                                                                                                   
ECT = 0 if ECT ˃0                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
The asymmetric residuals specified in (17) and (18) are then introduced as separate variables in 
the error-correction model to obtain the asymmetric short run dynamic model: 
 ∆brt = δ0 + b1∆prt  + 

n
i 1
bi∆prt-i +

m
i 1
ci∆brt-i  + φ1ECT
+
t-1 + φ2ECT
-
t-1 + μt                                                       (19) 
 where φ1 and φ2 are respectively the coefficients of the positive and negative error-correction 
terms.  
The positive error correction term (ECT+t-1) in equation (19) implies that if the bank rate is above its 
long-run equilibrium value following a decline in the policy rate, it will start falling in the next period; 
similarly, the negative error correction term (ECT-t-1) suggests that if the bank rate is below its 
equilibrium level following an increase in the policy rate, it will start rising in the subsequent period. 
The coefficients of the error-correction term, φ1 and φ2, provide the information on the speed of 
adjustment of the bank rates during expansionary and contractionary monetary policy.  
The presence of asymmetry is tested using the Wald test on the restriction that φ1 = φ2 in equation 
(19). If equality of the two coefficients is not rejected, this implies no asymmetry in the adjustment 
process, while rejection of equality points to existence of asymmetry. On the other hand, if φ1 ˃ φ2, 
this suggests that banks are quicker to adjust their rates downwards than they are to adjust them 
upwards, while if φ2 ˃ φ1, means that banks would adjust their rates upwards faster than they are 
to adjust them downwards.  
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V. Empirical results and discussion 
5.1. Time series properties of the data 
The Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests have been 
employed to determine whether the bank rates (lending , deposit and interbank rates) and the 
policy rates (Repo  and Treasury bill rates) are stationary or not. The tests have been performed 
with level and first difference series with only deterministic assumption of constant as the time 
series on interest rates do not exhibit any trend.  
Table 4:  Unit root tests with constant: 2008:1 - 2016:12 
Variables ADF PP 
 
 
             Level First difference                Level         First difference 
    LRSHT - 4.293981 - 17.22636           - 6.852495         - 37.87146 
    LRMED - 3.487204 - 14.65414           - 3.167672         - 15.98055 
  LRLOT - 3.681175 - 11.05033           - 6.580244         - 81.59973 
Dr-1m - 5.782765 - 10.66773           - 5.778322         - 42.22669 
Dr-3m - 2.348815 - 11.79147           - 3.938492         - 15.30330 
Dr-6m - 3.633511 - 13.18539           - 3.429478         - 14.58730 
            Tbr-1m - 1.693834 - 15.07884           - 2.400946         - 14.89926 
           Tbr-3m - 1.828337 - 11.42297           - 1.994364         - 11.36604 
           Tbr-6m - 2.191023          - 13.59482           - 2.709599         - 13.61173 
INTBAN - 1.635134          -10.86784           - 1.850376         - 10.86802 
Repo rate - 1.850841          - 9.351902           - 1.900449         - 9.359472 
C    
Critical value  at   
1% significance  
level 
 
- 3.493129 
 
-3.493129 
 
- 3.492523 
 
- 3.493129 
 
From the results of both tests in Table 4, it appears that the series of lending rates and one month 
deposit rate are stationary in level at 1% significance level , while the policy rates , the interbank , 
the three and six months deposit rates are found to be non-stationary , i.e I (1). However, all the 
variables are stationary in first difference. 
5.2. Testing for co-integration relationship 
Once the time series properties of the variables have been identified, the next step of the empirical 
analysis is to test for the co-integration relationship between the bank rates and the policy rates 
considered in this study. It is a common phenomenon that many economic time series data are 
non-stationary but move together over time; in particular, it has been documented in the literature 
that the bank rates cannot drift too far from the policy rate over a long period, suggesting that the 
series are bound by a long-run equilibrium relationship (Fuertes and Heffernan, 2008).  
The following results emerged from the cointegration tests. A long-run relationship has been 
identified between the deposit and Treasury bill rates of same maturities on the one hand and 
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between the deposit and the Repo rates, on the other hand; the interbank rate is also cointegrated 
with the Treasury bill and the Repo rates. Given the presence of cointegration relationship 
between these variables, asymmetric error correction models have been examined. By contrast, 
the lending rates have been found to be cointegrated with none of the policy rates.  
To test for the null hypothesis of no cointegration as well as for the significance of the long-run 
coefficients in equation (14), the Wald test (F-statistic) proposed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith 
(2001) has been used. Following the procedure explained earlier, equation (14) has been 
estimated by OLS and the computed F-statistic was compared with tabulated critical values. 
Table 5 presents the empirical results of the Wald test for the pairwise relationships between the 
bank rates and the policy rates.  
Table 5: Bounds cointegration test for deposit and policy rates 
Relationship Computed F-statistic 10% critical bounds 5% critical bounds 
  Dr-1m/Tbr-1m 7.39 4.04 - 4.78 4.94 - 5.73 
 Dr-3m/Tbr-3m 7.11 4.04 - 4.78 4.94 - 5.73 
Dr-6m/Tbr-6m 6.25 4.04 - 4.78 4.94 - 5.73 
   Dr-1m/Repo rate 9.58 4.04 - 4.78 4.94 - 5.73 
  Dr-3m/Repo rate 7.15 4.04 - 4.78 4.94 - 5.73 
    INTBAN/Repo rate 9.178 4.04 - 4.78 4.94 - 5.73 
         INBAN/Tbr-3m 9.295 4.04 - 4.78 4.94 - 5.73 
Note: The bounds testing critical values are obtained from Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001), p.300; 
Table CI (iii), Case III: unrestricted intercept and no trend. 
As can be seen in Table 5, the computed F-statistic test for every pairwise relationship between 
the selected variables is greater than the upper critical value at the 5% significance level, implying 
rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration and confirming the presence of a long-run 
relationship between the variables.  
5.3. Regression results and discussion 
Before proceeding to the discussion of empirical results, it is worth noting that in all regression 
results related to cointegration as well as to error correctional models, robustness of the estimated 
models has been assessed and was confirmed by the conventional diagnostic tests, i.e., the 
Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test, heteroschedasticity test (ARCH test), Jarque-Bera 
normality and Ramsey Reset specification tests. However some of the models failed to fulfill the 
normality test, but given the large number of observations (108) involved, this does not invalidate 
the robustness of the models as argued in Dube and Zhou (2014). To determine the lag structure 
of different models this study relied on the Hendry (1987) general to specific approach by starting 
with twelve lags and then removing non-significant lags; this implies that for each set of dependent 
and independent variables, the most parsimonious model has been selected for interpretation. 
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i). Deposit and interbank rates 
Long-run relationship 
Results of equations (20) through to (26) present the estimates of the long-run coefficients of the 
pairwise relationship between interbank, deposit, and policy rates for which a co-integration 
relationship has been identified. Depending on the maturity, the estimated long-run pass-through 
between the deposit and the Treasury bill rates ranges between 0.19 and 0.53, respectively, while 
the pass-through between the deposit rates and Repo rate varies between 0.28 and 0.62. The 
long-run pass-through from the Repo rate and the three months maturity Treasury bill rate to the 
interbank rate is respectively 1.24 and 0.86.  
Dr-1m = 3.36 + 0.19 Tbr-1m                                                                                                      (20)            
Dr-3m = 2.81 + 0.53 Tbr-3m                                                                                                      (21)  
Dr-6m = 4.11 + 0.51 Tbr-6m                                                                                                      (22) 
Dr-1m = 3.2 + 0.28 Repo rate                                                                                                    (23) 
Dr-3m = 3.62 + 0.62 Repo rate                                                                                                  (24) 
INTBAN = 0.72 + 1.24 Repo rate                                                                                               (25) 
INTBAN = 0.65 + 0.86 Tbr-3m                                                                                                   (26) 
These results show that the interbank rate is highly sensitive to changes in policy rates, exhibiting 
even an overshooting pass-through of 1.24 with the Repo rate. This result is similar to that found 
by Sande and Okello (2013) for the case of Uganda. A stronger long-run interest rate pass-through 
is also observed when the three months deposit rate is associated with the Treasury bill rate of 
same maturity and the Repo rate, implying that a higher proportion of the change in the two policy 
rates is transmitted to the deposit rate. In a policy perspective, this suggests that in the current 
BNR monetary policy framework, the Repo rate may be considered as a more effective instrument 
than the Treasury bill rate in the conduct of monetary policy, since it exerts a stronger impact on 
deposit and interbank rates. This also indicates that the decision of the Central Bank of Rwanda 
made since 2008 to use the Repo operations as the main instrument in the open market 
operations was relevant as it reinforced the monetary transmission mechanism. It is worth noting 
that knowing the class of assets affected by the monetary policy stance in the banks’ portfolio and 
the specific policy instrument that affects them is crucial for the Central bank.  
The above result on the overshooting pass-through of the Repo rate to the interbank rate is a very 
interesting information, since the pass-through of the policy rate to interbank rate is the first step of 
the entire pass-through process from the policy rate to bank retail rates. Furthermore, depending 
on the policy rate considered, only a small portion of the changes in the policy rates is transmitted 
to deposit rates, implying that in Rwanda the interest rate pass-through is incomplete in the deposit 
market and confirms the findings of the earlier study by Kigabo, Mwenese and Bagabe (2016) in 
which the long-run pass-through from the Treasury bill rate to deposit rate ranged between 0.14 
and 0.45.  
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The pass-through of the policy rate changes to deposit rates in Rwanda appears also to be 
significantly lower than in some other African countries. For Namibia, Sheefeni (2013) found a 
long-run interest rate pass-through of 0.88 between deposit rate and the 91 days Treasury bill rate; 
while the pass-through with the repo rate was 0.90. Using the repo rate as policy rate, 
Acheampong (2010) estimated a long-run pass-through of respectively 0.69 for the deposit rates in 
Ghana. For Nigeria, Ogundipe and Alege (2013) found a long-run pass-through of 0.60 between 
the Central bank policy rate and the deposit rate. 
Short-run dynamics and asymmetric adjustment 
The short run dynamics has been investigated using non-linear error-correction model as defined 
in equation (19) for asymmetric adjustment. A non-linear error-correction model corresponding to 
each of the long-run relationships presented in equations (20)-(26) has been estimated to unveil 
the possible asymmetric adjustment of short-run interest rate pass-through and the speed of 
adjustment of the interbank and deposit rates to long-run equilibrium.  
The objective of the analysis is to empirically ascertain whether the speed of adjustment of bank 
rates is different following a positive or negative shock in the policy rates. To measure the potential 
asymmetric adjustment of interbank and deposit rates to changes in the policy rates, equation (19) 
has been used and the null hypothesis has been tested using the Wald test statistic. The null 
hypothesis posits that the speed of adjustment is the same following a rise or a cut in the policy 
rate, implying that the coefficients of the error-correction terms in equation (19) are equal , that is 
H0 : φ1 = φ2. The results of the Wald test statistics are reported in Table 7. 
Table 7: Results of asymmetric dynamic adjustment    
 
        Deposit rate / Policy 
rate 
 
φ1 ECT(-1)
+ 
 
φ2 ECT (-1)
- 
 
Wald test 
Null hypothesis 
Ho : φ1= φ2 
      ∆Dr-1m/∆Tbr-1m  -0.8014  -       -5.65 
     (0.000) 
  -0.2854         -1.41 
(0.161) 
 3.2335 [0.0721] 
      ∆Dr-3m/∆Tbr-3m 
 
 -0.5220    -2.96 
    (0.004) 
  -0.1509         -0.781 
 (0.437) 
 1.3844 [0.2304] 
      ∆Dr-6m/∆Tbr-6m 
 
  -0.2534    -1.81 
    (0.074) 
   -0.5925         -3.37 
 (0.001) 
 1.5676 [0.2106] 
∆Dr-1m/∆Repo rate 
 
  -0.8140    -5.19 
    (0.000) 
   -0.2641 -1.81 
  (0.067) 
 4.8427 [0.0278] 
∆Dr-3m/∆Repo rate   -0.9666     -2.91 
    (0.005) 
   -0.2462  -2.45 
  (0.016) 
3.6194 [0.0571] 
∆INTBAN/Repo rate -0.144     -1.95 
    (0.054) 
  -0.176 
 
          -1.73 
  (0.088) 
 0.0465 [ 0.829] 
  
In Table 7, φ1 represents the speed of adjustment coefficient associated with a positive deviations 
when the deposit rate is above its long-run equilibrium value, implying a decrease in the policy rate 
and φ2 represents the speed of adjustment coefficient associated with a negative deviation when 
the deposit rate is below its long-run equilibrium value, reflecting an increase in the policy rate.  
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The results of the empirical estimates support the evidence of regime switching adjustment of the 
bank rates and confirm asymmetric adjustment of the deposit rates to changes in the policy rates 
in some cases. From these results, the null hypothesis, H0:φ1 = φ2, has been rejected at the 5-10% 
significance level in three cases: when the deposit rate and the Treasury bill rate of one month of 
maturity are associated on the one hand, and when the deposit rate of three months of maturity is 
linked to Repo rate, on the other hand. Likewise, the null hypothesis has also been rejected at the 
5% significance level when the deposit rate of one month of maturity is associated with the Repo 
rate. Hence in these three cases, presence of asymmetric adjustment has been demonstrated 
suggesting that in the other remaining three cases, including three months, six months maturity 
deposit rates and the interbank rate , the null hypothesis has not been rejected , implying that the 
adjustment process to long-run equilibrium is symmetric. Furthermore, it is worth noting that on 
average, in the cases where asymmetric adjustment has been detected, the coefficient φ1 is higher 
than the coefficient φ2. These findings are shown by the results of the Wald test statistic and the 
corresponding p-values reported in the last column of Table 7.  
Given these results and considering cases where the null hypothesis has been rejected (three out 
of six), it appears that in Rwanda, the deposit rates exhibit upward rigidity, φ1 ˃ φ2, implying that 
banks will tend to adjust their deposit rates downward at a faster rate than adjusting them upward.  
This finding which is consistent with the collusive pricing behavior of banks and valid in 
concentrated market, where banks are in a better position to avoid increase on deposit rates to 
minimize the cost of their funds has also been observed by Samba and Yan (2010) in member 
countries of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community and Aziakpono and Wilson 
(2010) in South Africa. Presence of asymmetry in the adjustment process of bank rates may also 
be attributable to inefficiencies in the banking sector (Fuertes, Heffernan and Kalotchou, 2006). 
Conversely, the adjustment speed of the interbank rate is stronger in case of negative shock, 
making it faster to adjust upward than downward. 
It emerged also from the asymmetric adjustment models that only the relationships between the 
deposit and Treasury bill rates of three months maturity, the interbank rate and the repo rate 
exhibit a significant immediate pass-through of the policy rate with a coefficient of 0.255 and 0.483 
respectively. The estimated mean adjustment lag that is the time it takes for the deposit rate to 
return to equilibrium after short term disturbance is one month and a half for the deposit rate and 
three months and a half for the interbank rate.  
ii). Lending rates 
Long-run and short run relationship 
Empirical estimations showed that lending rates were cointegrated with neither of the policy rates; 
hence the short and long-run pass-through of the policy rate to lending rates has been estimated 
by means of the transformed ADL as proposed by Keele and De Boef (2004) on the basis of 
equations (11) and (12). Fifteen regressions have been run linking each category of lending rate 
(short, medium and long term) to policy rates. A significant long-run relationship has been 
identified only between the long term lending rate (LROT) and the Repo rate and an asymmetric 
error-correction model has also been estimated, while the other regressions yielded no significant 
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relationships between the variables. The estimated long-run pass-through of the Repo rate to long-
term lending rate is as follows: 
LRLOT = 5.16 + 0.228 Repo rate                                                                                            (27) 
As mentioned above, only in one case, a significant long-run and short run pass-through has been 
detected between the long term lending rate and the Repo rate. The long-run pass-through 
estimated on the basis of equation (12) is 0.228 in equation (27), while the short run or immediate 
pass-through calculated following the error-correction model in equation (12) is 0.315. The speed 
of adjustment in the short run error-correction model is -0.18; on the other hand, the mean 
adjustment lag (MAL) in the model is close to four months. There is no evidence of asymmetric 
adjustment since the adjustment process adjusts only to positive deviations from long-run 
equilibrium value; this result is similar to the finding by Bangura (2011) in the case of Ghana.  
Overall, it emerges from the above results that the interest rate pass-through from both policy rates 
to lending rate is incomplete in the short run as well as in the long-run. These results confirm those 
found in Kigabo, Mwenese and Bagabe (2016) where the long-run pass-through between the 
lending and Treasury bill rates was 0.097, while the short run pass-through was estimated at 0.19. 
The lack of a cointegration relationship and the weak interest rate pass-through between the policy 
rates and lending rates confirm the absence of co-movement observed in the developments of the 
lending and policy rates depicted in Figures 1 and 2. It also suggests that lending rates may be 
determined by other factors than policy rates.  
In a recent policy document published by the National Bank of Rwanda, it was recognized that the 
“weak responsiveness of the lending rates to the change in the key repo rate is due to, among 
other factors, high operating costs in the banking sector and high provisions for bad loans despite 
declining in NPL ratio. In addition, behavior of borrowers such as lack of information on loan 
conditions and culture of not bargaining with banks has contributed to the rigidities in lending rates 
charged by banks” (NBR,  February 2015).  
Kigabo and Barebereho (2008) also concluded that in Rwanda, the volume of non-performing 
loans and risk aversion, the operating costs and macroeconomic variables (inflation), are among 
the main determinants of high lending rates and interest rate spread. Similar conclusion was drawn 
by Kiptui (2014) in his analysis pointing to macroeconomic variables (inflation, GDP growth rate 
and exchange rate variability) as the main factors influencing the fluctuations of the lending rate 
and the interest rate spread in Kenya.  
Empirical results for other African countries show also that on average the pass-through from the 
policy rate to lending rates is significantly lower in Rwanda. In the case of Nigeria the effect of the 
policy rate on lending rates is 0.72 and 0.70 in the short and long-run respectively (Ogundipe and 
Alege, 2013), while the pass-through of the market rate to lending rates in CAEM countries is 0.67 
in the short run and 6.21 in the long run (Samba and Yan ,2010).  
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VI. Conclusion and policy implications  
Drawing on a standard analytical framework and empirical strategies, this study investigated the 
interest rate pass-through and the adjustment dynamics between the bank rates and the policy 
rates in Rwanda. The study used monthly data covering the period from 2008-1 to 2016-12. ADL 
model, cointegration approach, linear and non-linear error correction models have been used for 
empirical analysis.  
The results of the study may be summarized as follows. The estimated long-run and short run 
pass-through coefficients between the bank rates and the policy rates show clearly that the interest 
rate pass-through is incomplete in Rwanda, confirming the weakness of the interest rate channel 
found in previous studies. On average the pass-through is higher for deposit rates than for lending 
rates in the long-run. Concerning the adjustment process of the bank rates, this study provided 
evidence of asymmetric adjustment of deposit rates to changes in policy rates .The results of the 
study showed in particular that deposit rates exhibit upward stickiness, meaning that banks adjust 
their deposit rates downward faster following cuts in policy rates, while they are reluctant in 
revising them upward following an increase in the policy rates.  
The incomplete interest rate pass-through between the bank rates in Rwanda may be the result of 
underdeveloped financial system, relative degree of concentration, low level of competition and 
structural excess liquidity in the banking system (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994). The presence of 
asymmetric adjustment on the other hand may be explained by asymmetric information in the loan 
and deposit markets (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) and inefficiencies in the banking system (Fuertes, 
Hefferman and Kaloutchou, 2006). Operating costs, high provisions for non-performing loans have 
also been pointed out to explain the stickiness of the lending rates to changes in the policy rate in 
Rwanda. 
The empirical results of this study have policy implications. The weak pass-through identified in 
Rwanda implies that to be effective in the current monetary policy framework, cuts or increases of 
policy rates should be stronger. In this context, being aware of the asymmetric adjustment of the 
bank rates would allow monetary authority to determine the appropriate timing and instrument 
before taking policy action. With regard to monetary instruments, the findings of this study suggest 
that the Repo rate would be the most effective instrument to use given its higher impact on 
interbank, deposit and lending rates. Hence the role and the share of the repo transactions should 
be enhanced in the open market operations.  
Overall, the results of this study suggest that reforms in the financial sector in Rwanda should be 
pursued and support creation of new financial products and non-bank financial institutions to 
reduce concentration and increase competition in the financial sector. In addition, the monetary 
authorities should promote and implement policies that will further spur the development of 
security market to provide alternative sources of saving and funding to firms and individuals mainly 
relying so far on the banking system; the efforts currently made to strengthen the capital market 
through issuance of Government T-Bonds are a step in the right direction. To enhance the interest 
rate pass-through and consequently the monetary transmission mechanism, regular 
communication between the National Bank of Rwanda with banks should focus on strategies to 
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reduce information asymmetry in the deposit and loan markets, promote efficiency of the banking 
sector in liquidity management, improve the quality of loans and reduce the operating costs.  
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